Vern R. Walker wrote:
> So what are we to make of such passages?
> Are they not to be regarded as serious arguments,
> or serious lines of reasoning? Even leaving aside
> our poets and mystics, our novelists and
> rhetoricians -- although I'm not sure why we should
> leave them aside! -- our tradition is still filled with
> what purports to be warranted inferences -- yet
> inferences in forms not usually sported by our
> scientists and lawyers (although the latter often
> come closer). Vern.
Vern,
Though I would be the last person to suggest that all or most ordinary
human reasoning could or should be replaced by a Reason artificialle,
like Clark Carrington, I do think that there is something (much) to
Clark Carrington's (briefly-made) point that modeling factual inference
may be useful because models make it possible to enlist the aid of a
machine to evaluate inferences. Clark's point can be expressed more
broadly: models of inference are sometimes useful _tools_.
Models of inference can perform a variety of tasks. Sometimes we can use
them so that we can pretty much trust machines to do our calculating or
"thinking" for us (e.g., calculating the orbit of a planetary body).
Sometimes our use of such models has a more modest objective. For
example, we may use them just to try to sort out our own thinking, to
grasp our own (present?) thinking a bit better.
In the law it will usually be the case that our use of models of
inference -- if we use them at all -- will be limited to such heuristic
purposes. But I think we should be cautious before rejecting any
suggested use of a model that is more ambitious (much less the use of a
model for purposes of self-interrogation). One generation's artificial
reason may be the next generation's natural way of thinking. The
important thing to keep in mind is that all models of inference _are_
tools and that they should be kept in their proper place. If we do that,
we may reduce the frequency of silly or overambitious applications of
models of inference and avert the possibility of unthinking applications
that destroy or distort the values that you or I or society holds dear.
This is my last word ! -- for the time being.
Best regards,
Peter
*********************************************************
Tillers' Dynamic Evidence Site
--with "frames":
http://www.tiac.net/users/tillers/index.html
--sans "frames":
http://www.tiac.net/users/tillers/home.html
**********************************************************
Peter Tillers, Professor of Law
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University
55 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10003, U.S.A.
(212) 790-0334; FAX (212) 790-0205
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Vern R. Walker wrote:
Vern,So what are we to make of such passages?
Are they not to be regarded as serious arguments,
or serious lines of reasoning? Even leaving aside
our poets and mystics, our novelists and
rhetoricians -- although I'm not sure why we should
leave them aside! -- our tradition is still filled with
what purports to be warranted inferences -- yet
inferences in forms not usually sported by our
scientists and lawyers (although the latter often
come closer). Vern.
Though I would be the last person to suggest that all or most ordinary human reasoning could or should be replaced by a Reason artificialle, like Clark Carrington, I do think that there is something (much) to Clark Carrington's (briefly-made) point that modeling factual inference may be useful because models make it possible to enlist the aid of a machine to evaluate inferences. Clark's point can be expressed more broadly: models of inference are sometimes useful _tools_.
Models of inference can perform a variety of tasks. Sometimes we can use them so that we can pretty much trust machines to do our calculating or "thinking" for us (e.g., calculating the orbit of a planetary body). Sometimes our use of such models has a more modest objective. For example, we may use them just to try to sort out our own thinking, to grasp our own (present?) thinking a bit better.
In the law it will usually be the case that our use of models of inference -- if we use them at all -- will be limited to such heuristic purposes. But I think we should be cautious before rejecting any suggested use of a model that is more ambitious (much less the use of a model for purposes of self-interrogation). One generation's artificial reason may be the next generation's natural way of thinking. The important thing to keep in mind is that all models of inference _are_ tools and that they should be kept in their proper place. If we do that, we may reduce the frequency of silly or overambitious applications of models of inference and avert the possibility of unthinking applications that destroy or distort the values that you or I or society holds dear.
This is my last word ! -- for the time being.
Best regards,
Peter
*********************************************************
Tillers' Dynamic Evidence Site**********************************************************--with "frames": http://www.tiac.net/users/tillers/index.html
--sans "frames": http://www.tiac.net/users/tillers/home.html