

12 The RSA Function

RSA was among the first public-key cryptography developed. It was first described in 1978, and is named after its creators, Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Len Adleman.¹ Although “textbook” RSA by itself is not a secure encryption scheme, it is a fundamental ingredient for public-key cryptography.

12.1 Modular Arithmetic & Number Theory

In general, public-key cryptography relies on computational problems from abstract algebra. Of the techniques currently known for public-key crypto, RSA uses some of the simplest mathematical ideas, so it’s an ideal place to start.

We will be working with modular arithmetic, so please review the modular arithmetic concepts from [Chapter 0](#). We need to understand the behavior of the four basic arithmetic operations in the set $\mathbb{Z}_n = \{0, \dots, n - 1\}$. Addition, subtraction, and multiplication are straight-forward. Division, however, is not so simple.

Greatest Common Divisors

If $d \mid x$ and $d \mid y$, then d is a **common divisor** of x and y . The largest possible such d is called the **greatest common divisor (GCD)**, denoted $\text{gcd}(x, y)$. If $\text{gcd}(x, y) = 1$, then we say that x and y are **relatively prime**. The oldest “algorithm” ever documented is the procedure that Euclid described for computing GCDs (ca. 300 BCE):

<pre>GCD(x, y): // Euclid's algorithm if y = 0 then return x else return GCD(y, x % y)</pre>
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Multiplicative Inverses

We let \mathbb{Z}_n^* denote the set $\{x \in \mathbb{Z}_n \mid \text{gcd}(x, n) = 1\}$, the **multiplicative group modulo n** . This group is *closed under multiplication mod n* , which just means that if $x, y \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ then $xy \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$, where xy denotes multiplication mod n . Indeed, if $\text{gcd}(x, n) = \text{gcd}(y, n) = 1$, then $\text{gcd}(xy, n) = 1$ and thus $\text{gcd}(xy \% n, n) = 1$ by Euclid’s algorithm.

In abstract algebra, a *group* is a set that is closed under its operation (in this case multiplication mod n), and is also closed under inverses. So if \mathbb{Z}_n^* is really a group under multiplication mod n , then for every $x \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ there must be a $y \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ so that $xy \equiv_n 1$. In other words, y is the **multiplicative inverse** of x (and we would give it the name x^{-1}).

¹Clifford Cocks developed an equivalent scheme in 1973, but it was classified since he was working for British intelligence.

The fact that we can always find a multiplicative inverse for elements of \mathbb{Z}_n^* is due to the following theorem:

Theorem 12.1 (Bezout's Theorem) *For all integers x and y , there exist integers a and b such that $ax + by = \gcd(x, y)$. In fact, $\gcd(x, y)$ is the smallest positive integer that can be written as an integral linear combination of x and y .*

What does this have to do with multiplicative inverses? Take any $x \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$; we will show how to find its multiplicative inverse. Since $x \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$, we have $\gcd(x, n) = 1$. From Bezout's theorem, there exist integers a, b satisfying $ax + bn = 1$. By reducing both sides of this equation modulo n , we have

$$1 \equiv_n ax + bn \equiv_n ax + 0$$

(since $bn \equiv_n 0$). Thus the integer a guaranteed by Bezout's theorem is the multiplicative inverse of x modulo n .

We have shown that every $x \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ has a multiplicative inverse mod n . That is, if $\gcd(x, n) = 1$, then x has a multiplicative inverse. But might it be possible for x to have a multiplicative inverse mod n even if $\gcd(x, n) \neq 1$?

Suppose that we have an element x with a multiplicative inverse; that is, $xx^{-1} \equiv_n 1$. Then n divides $xx^{-1} - 1$, so we can write $xx^{-1} - 1 = kn$ (as an expression over the integers) for some integer k . Rearranging, we have that $xx^{-1} - kn = 1$. That is to say, we have a way to write 1 as an integral linear combination of x and n . From Bezout's theorem, this must mean that $\gcd(x, n) = 1$. Hence, $x \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$. We conclude that:

$$\mathbb{Z}_n^* \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{x \in \mathbb{Z}_n \mid \gcd(x, n) = 1\} = \{x \in \mathbb{Z}_n \mid \exists y \in \mathbb{Z}_n : xy \equiv_n 1\}.$$

The elements of \mathbb{Z}_n^* are *exactly* those elements with a multiplicative inverse mod n .

Furthermore, multiplicative inverses can be computed efficiently using an extended version of Euclid's GCD algorithm. While we are computing the GCD, we can also keep track of integers a and b from Bezout's theorem at every step of the recursion; see below:

```

EXTGCD(x, y):
  // returns (d, a, b) such that gcd(x, y) = d = ax + by
  if y = 0:
    return (x, 1, 0)
  else:
    (d, a, b) := EXTGCD(y, x % y)
    return (d, b, a - b[x/y])

```

Example *Below is a table showing the computation of $\text{EXTGCD}(35, 144)$. Note that the columns x, y are computed from the top down (as recursive calls to EXTGCD are made), while the columns d, a, b are computed from bottom up (as recursive calls return). Also note that in each row, we indeed have $d = ax + by$.*

x	y	$\lfloor \frac{x}{y} \rfloor$	$x \% y$	d	a	b
35	144	0	35	1	-37	9
144	35	4	4	1	9	-37
35	4	8	3	1	-1	9
4	3	1	1	1	1	-1
3	1	3	0	1	0	1
1	0	-	-	1	1	0

The final result demonstrates that $35^{-1} \equiv_{144} -37 \equiv_{144} 107$.

The Totient Function

Euler's **totient** function is defined as $\phi(n) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} |\mathbb{Z}_n^*|$, in other words, the number of elements of \mathbb{Z}_n which are relatively prime to n .

As an example, if p is a prime, then $\mathbb{Z}_n^* = \mathbb{Z}_n \setminus \{0\}$ because every integer in \mathbb{Z}_n apart from zero is relatively prime to p . Therefore, $\phi(p) = p - 1$.

We will frequently work modulo n where n is the product of two distinct primes $n = pq$. In that case, $\phi(n) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$. To see why, let's count how many elements in \mathbb{Z}_{pq} share a common divisor with pq (i.e., are *not* in \mathbb{Z}_{pq}^*).

- ▶ The multiples of p share a common divisor with pq . These include $0, p, 2p, 3p, \dots, (q - 1)p$. There are q elements in this list.
- ▶ The multiples of q share a common divisor with pq . These include $0, q, 2q, 3q, \dots, (p - 1)q$. There are p elements in this list.

We have clearly double-counted element 0 in these lists. But no other element is double counted. Any item that occurs in both lists would be a common multiple of both p and q , but the least common multiple of p and q is pq since p and q are relatively prime. But pq is larger than any item in these lists.

We count $p + q - 1$ elements in \mathbb{Z}_{pq} which share a common divisor with pq . That leaves the rest to reside in \mathbb{Z}_{pq}^* , and there are $pq - (p + q - 1) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$ of them. Hence $\phi(pq) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$.

General formulas for $\phi(n)$ exist, but they typically rely on knowing the prime factorization of n . We will see more connections between the difficulty of computing $\phi(n)$ and the difficulty of factoring n later in this part of the course.

Here's an important theorem from abstract algebra:

Theorem 12.2
(Euler's Theorem)

If $x \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ then $x^{\phi(n)} \equiv_n 1$.

As a final corollary, we can deduce Fermat's "little theorem," that $x^p \equiv_p x$ for all x , when p is prime.²

²You have to handle the case of $x \equiv_p 0$ separately, since $0 \notin \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ so Euler's theorem doesn't apply to it.

12.2 The RSA Function

The RSA function is defined as follows:

- ▶ Let p and q be distinct primes (later we will say more about how they are chosen), and let $N = pq$. N is called the **RSA modulus**.
- ▶ Let e and d be integers such that $ed \equiv_{\phi(N)} 1$. That is, e and d are multiplicative inverses mod $\phi(N)$ — not mod N ! e is called the **encryption exponent**, and d is called the **decryption exponent**. These names are historical, but not entirely precise since RSA by itself does not achieve CPA security.
- ▶ The RSA function is: $m \mapsto m^e \% N$, where $m \in \mathbb{Z}_N$.
- ▶ The inverse RSA function is: $c \mapsto c^d \% N$, where $c \in \mathbb{Z}_N$.

Essentially, the RSA function (and its inverse) is a simple modular exponentiation. The most confusing thing to remember about RSA is that e and d “live” in $\mathbb{Z}_{\phi(N)}^*$, while m and c “live” in \mathbb{Z}_N .

Let’s make sure the function we called the “inverse RSA function” is actually in inverse of the RSA function. The RSA function raises its input to the e power, and the inverse RSA function raises its input to the d power. So it suffices to show that raising to the ed power has no effect modulo N .

Since $ed \equiv_{\phi(N)} 1$, we can write $ed = t\phi(N) + 1$ for some integer t . Then:

$$(m^e)^d = m^{ed} = m^{t\phi(N)+1} = (m^{\phi(N)})^t m \equiv_N 1^t m = m$$

Note that we have used the fact that $m^{\phi(N)} \equiv_N 1$ from Euler’s theorem.

to-do

Discuss computational aspects of modular exponentiation, and in general remind readers that efficiency of numerical algorithms is measured in terms of the number of bits needed to write the input.

Security Properties

In these notes we will not formally define a desired security property for RSA. Roughly speaking, the idea is that even when N and e can be made public, it should be hard to compute the operation $c \mapsto c^d \% N$. In other words, the RSA function $m \mapsto m^e \% N$ is:

- ▶ easy to compute given N and e
- ▶ hard to invert given N and e but not d
- ▶ easy to invert given d

to-do

more details

12.3 Chinese Remainder Theorem

The multiplicative group \mathbb{Z}_N^* has some interesting structure when N is the product of distinct primes. We can use this structure to optimize some algorithms related to RSA.

History. Some time around the 4th century CE, Chinese mathematician Sun Tzu in his book *Sun Tze Suan Ching* discussed problems relating to simultaneous equations of modular arithmetic:

“We have a number of things, but we do not know exactly how many. If we count them by threes we have two left over. If we count them by fives we have three left over. If we count them by sevens we have two left over. How many things are there?”³

In our notation, he is asking for a solution x to the following system of equations:

$$x \equiv_3 2$$

$$x \equiv_5 3$$

$$x \equiv_7 2$$

A generalized way to solve equations of this kind was later given by mathematician Qin Jiushao in 1247 CE. For our eventual application to RSA, we will only need to consider the case of two simultaneous equations.

Theorem 12.3 (CRT) Suppose $\gcd(r, s) = 1$. Then for all integers u, v , there is a solution for x in the following system of equations:

$$x \equiv_r u$$

$$x \equiv_s v$$

Furthermore, this solution is *unique* modulo rs .

Proof Since $\gcd(r, s) = 1$, we have by Bezout’s theorem that $1 = ar + bs$ for some integers a and b . Furthermore, b and s are multiplicative inverses modulo r . Now choose $x = var + u bs$. Then,

$$x = var + u bs \equiv_r (va)0 + u(s^{-1}s) = u$$

So $x \equiv_r u$, as desired. By a symmetric argument, we can see that $x \equiv_s v$, so x is a solution to the system of equations.

Now we argue why the solution is *unique* modulo rs . Suppose x and x' are two solutions to the system of equations, so we have:

$$x \equiv_r x' \equiv_r u$$

$$x \equiv_s x' \equiv_s v$$

³Translation due to Joseph Needham, *Science and Civilisation in China, vol. 3: Mathematics and Sciences of the Heavens and Earth*, 1959.

Since $x \equiv_r x'$ and $x \equiv_s x'$, it must be that $x - x'$ is a multiple of r and a multiple of s . Since r and s are relatively prime, their least common multiple is rs , so $x - x'$ must be a multiple of rs . Hence, $x \equiv_{rs} x'$. So any two solutions to this system of equations are congruent mod rs . ■

We can associate every pair $(u, v) \in \mathbb{Z}_r \times \mathbb{Z}_s$ with its corresponding system of equations of the above form (with u and v as the right-hand-sides). The CRT suggests a relationship between these pairs $(u, v) \in \mathbb{Z}_r \times \mathbb{Z}_s$ and elements of \mathbb{Z}_{rs} .

For $x \in \mathbb{Z}_{rs}$, and $(u, v) \in \mathbb{Z}_r \times \mathbb{Z}_s$, let us write

$$x \overset{\text{crt}}{\longleftrightarrow} (u, v)$$

to mean that x is a solution to $x \equiv_r u$ and $x \equiv_s v$. The CRT says that the $\overset{\text{crt}}{\longleftrightarrow}$ relation is a *bijection* (1-to-1 correspondence) between elements of \mathbb{Z}_{rs} and elements of $\mathbb{Z}_r \times \mathbb{Z}_s$.

In fact, the relationship is even deeper than that. Consider the following observations:

1. If $x \overset{\text{crt}}{\longleftrightarrow} (u, v)$ and $x' \overset{\text{crt}}{\longleftrightarrow} (u', v')$, then $x + x' \overset{\text{crt}}{\longleftrightarrow} (u + u', v + v')$. You can see this by adding relevant equations together from the system of equations. Note here that the addition $x + x'$ is done mod rs ; the addition $u + u'$ is done mod r ; and the addition $v + v'$ is done mod s .
2. If $x \overset{\text{crt}}{\longleftrightarrow} (u, v)$ and $x' \overset{\text{crt}}{\longleftrightarrow} (u', v')$, then $xx' \overset{\text{crt}}{\longleftrightarrow} (uu', vv')$. You can see this by multiplying relevant equations together from the system of equations. As above, the multiplication xx' is mod rs ; uu' is done mod r ; vv' is done mod s .
3. Suppose $x \overset{\text{crt}}{\longleftrightarrow} (u, v)$. Then $\gcd(x, rs) = 1$ if and only if $\gcd(u, r) = \gcd(v, s) = 1$. In other words, the $\overset{\text{crt}}{\longleftrightarrow}$ relation is a 1-to-1 correspondence between elements of \mathbb{Z}_{rs}^* and elements of $\mathbb{Z}_r^* \times \mathbb{Z}_s^*$.⁴

The bottom line is that the CRT demonstrates that \mathbb{Z}_{rs} and $\mathbb{Z}_r \times \mathbb{Z}_s$ **are essentially the same mathematical object**. In the terminology of abstract algebra, the two structures are *isomorphic*.

Think of \mathbb{Z}_{rs} and $\mathbb{Z}_r \times \mathbb{Z}_s$ being two different kinds of *names* or *encodings* for the same set of items. If we know the “ \mathbb{Z}_{rs} -names” of two items, we can add them (mod rs) to get the \mathbb{Z}_{rs} -name of the result. If we know the “ $\mathbb{Z}_r \times \mathbb{Z}_s$ -names” of two items, we can add them (first components mod r and second components mod s) to get the $\mathbb{Z}_r \times \mathbb{Z}_s$ -name of the result. The CRT says that both of these ways of adding give the same results.

Additionally, the proof of the CRT shows us how to convert between these styles of names for a given object. So given $x \in \mathbb{Z}_{rs}$, we can compute $(x \% r, x \% s)$, which is the corresponding element/name in $\mathbb{Z}_r \times \mathbb{Z}_s$. Given $(u, v) \in \mathbb{Z}_r \times \mathbb{Z}_s$, we can compute $x = var + uvs \% rs$ (where a and b are computed from the extended Euclidean algorithm) to obtain the corresponding element/name $x \in \mathbb{Z}_{rs}$.

From a **mathematical** perspective, \mathbb{Z}_{rs} and $\mathbb{Z}_r \times \mathbb{Z}_s$ are the same object. However, from a **computational** perspective, there might be reason to favor one over the other. In fact, it turns out that doing computations in the $\mathbb{Z}_r \times \mathbb{Z}_s$ realm is significantly cheaper.

⁴Fun fact: this yields an alternative proof that $\phi(pq) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$ when p and q are prime. That is, $\phi(pq) = |\mathbb{Z}_{pq}^*| = |\mathbb{Z}_p^* \times \mathbb{Z}_q^*| = (p - 1)(q - 1)$.

Application to RSA

In the context of RSA decryption, we are interested in taking $c \in \mathbb{Z}_{pq}$ and computing $c^d \in \mathbb{Z}_{pq}$. Since p and q are distinct primes, $\gcd(p, q) = 1$ and the CRT is in effect.

Thinking in terms of \mathbb{Z}_{pq} -arithmetic, raising c to the d power is rather straightforward. However, the CRT suggests that another approach is possible: We could convert c into its $\mathbb{Z}_p \times \mathbb{Z}_q$ representation, do the exponentiation under that representation, and then convert back into the \mathbb{Z}_{pq} representation. This approach corresponds to the bold arrows in Figure 12.1, and the CRT guarantees that the result will be the same either way.




Figure 12.1: Two ways to compute $c \mapsto c^d$ in \mathbb{Z}_{pq} .

Now why would we ever want to compute things this way? Performing an exponentiation modulo an n -bit number requires about n^3 steps. Let's suppose that p and q are each n bits long, so that the RSA modulus N is $2n$ bits long. Performing $c \mapsto c^d$ modulo N therefore costs about $(2n)^3 = 8n^3$ total.

The CRT approach involves two modular exponentiations — one mod p and one mod q . Each of these moduli are only n bits long, so the total cost is $n^3 + n^3 = 2n^3$. **The CRT approach is 4 times faster!** Of course, we are neglecting the cost of converting between representations, but that cost is very small in comparison to the cost of exponentiation.

It's worth pointing out that this speedup can only be done for the RSA *inverse* function. One must know p and q in order to exploit the Chinese Remainder Theorem, and only the party performing the RSA inverse function typically knows this.

12.4 The Hardness of Factoring N

Clearly the hardness of RSA is related to the hardness of factoring the modulus N . Indeed, if you can factor N , then you can compute $\phi(N)$, solve for d , and easily invert RSA. So factoring must be *at least as hard as* inverting RSA.

Factoring integers (or, more specifically, factoring RSA moduli) is believed to be a hard problem for classical computers.⁵ In this section we show that some other problems related to RSA are “as hard as factoring.” What does it mean for a computational problem to be “as hard as factoring?” More formally, in this section we will show the following:

Theorem 12.4 *Either **all** of the following problems can be solved in polynomial-time, or **none** of them can:*

⁵A polynomial-time algorithm for factoring is known for quantum computers.

1. Given an RSA modulus $N = pq$, compute its factors p and q .
2. Given an RSA modulus $N = pq$ compute $\phi(N) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$.
3. Given an RSA modulus $N = pq$ and value e , compute its inverse d , where $ed \equiv_{\phi(N)} 1$.
4. Given an RSA modulus $N = pq$, find any $x \not\equiv_N \pm 1$ such that $x^2 \equiv_N 1$.

To prove the theorem, we will show:

- ▶ if there is an efficient algorithm for (1), then we can use it as a subroutine to construct an efficient algorithm for (2). This is straight-forward: if you have a subroutine factoring N into p and q , then you can call the subroutine and then compute $(p - 1)(q - 1)$.
- ▶ if there is an efficient algorithm for (2), then we can use it as a subroutine to construct an efficient algorithm for (3). This is also straight-forward: if you have a subroutine computing $\phi(N)$ given N , then you can compute the multiplicative inverse of e using the extended Euclidean algorithm.
- ▶ if there is an efficient algorithm for (3), then we can use it as a subroutine to construct an efficient algorithm for (4).
- ▶ if there is an efficient algorithm for (4), then we can use it as a subroutine to construct an efficient algorithm for (1).

Below we focus on the final two implications.

Using square roots of unity to factor N

Problem (4) of [Theorem 12.4](#) concerns a new concept known as square roots of unity:

Definition 12.5 (Sqrt of unity) x is a **square root of unity modulo N** if $x^2 \equiv_N 1$. If $x \not\equiv_N 1$ and $x \not\equiv_N -1$, then we say that x is a **non-trivial square root of unity**.

Note that ± 1 are always square roots of unity modulo N , for any N ($(\pm 1)^2 = 1$ over the integers, so it is also true mod N). But if N is the product of distinct odd primes, then N has 4 square roots of unity: two trivial and two non-trivial ones (see the exercises in this chapter).

Claim 12.6 Suppose there is an efficient algorithm for computing nontrivial square roots of unity modulo N . Then there is an efficient algorithm for factoring N . (This is the (4) \Rightarrow (1) step in [Theorem 12.4](#).)

Proof The reduction is rather simple. Suppose NTSRU is an algorithm that on input N returns a non-trivial square root of unity modulo N . Then we can factor N with the following algorithm:

```

FACTOR( $N$ ):
 $x :=$  NTSRU( $N$ )
return gcd( $N, x + 1$ ) and gcd( $N, x - 1$ )

```


The algorithm is simple, but we must argue that it is correct. When x is a nontrivial square root of unity modulo N , we have the following:

$$\begin{array}{lll} x^2 \equiv_{pq} 1 & \Rightarrow pq \mid x^2 - 1 & \Rightarrow pq \mid (x+1)(x-1) \\ x \not\equiv_{pq} 1 & & \Rightarrow pq \nmid (x-1) \\ x \not\equiv_{pq} -1 & & \Rightarrow pq \nmid (x+1) \end{array}$$

So the prime factorization of $(x+1)(x-1)$ contains a factor of p and a factor of q . But neither $x+1$ nor $x-1$ contain factors of *both* p and q . Hence $x+1$ and $x-1$ must each contain factors of exactly one of $\{p, q\}$, and $\{\gcd(pq, x-1), \gcd(pq, x+1)\} = \{p, q\}$. ■

Finding square roots of unity

Claim 12.7 *If there is an efficient algorithm for computing $d \equiv_{\phi(N)} e^{-1}$ given N and e , then there is an efficient algorithm for computing nontrivial square roots of unity modulo N . (This is the (3) \Rightarrow (4) step in [Theorem 12.4](#).)*

Proof Suppose we have an algorithm `FIND_D` that on input (N, e) returns the corresponding exponent d . Then consider the following algorithm which uses `FIND_D` as a subroutine:

```
SRU(N):
  choose  $e$  as a random  $n$ -bit prime
   $d := \text{FIND\_D}(N, e)$ 
  write  $ed - 1 = 2^s r$ , with  $r$  odd
  // i.e., factor out as many 2s as possible
   $w \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N$ 
  if  $\gcd(w, N) \neq 1$ : //  $w \notin \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ 
    use  $\gcd(w, N)$  to factor  $N = pq$ 
    compute a nontrivial square root of unity using  $p$  &  $q$ 
   $x := w^r \% N$ 
  if  $x \equiv_N 1$  then return 1
  for  $i = 0$  to  $s$ :
    if  $x^2 \equiv_N 1$  then return  $x$ 
     $x := x^2 \% N$ 
```

There are several return statements in this algorithm, and it should be clear that all of them indeed return a square root of unity. Furthermore, the algorithm does eventually return within the main for-loop, because x takes on the sequence of values:

$$w^r, w^{2r}, w^{4r}, w^{8r}, \dots, w^{2^s r}$$

and the final value of that sequence satisfies

$$w^{2^s r} = w^{ed-1} \equiv_N w^{(ed-1)\% \phi(N)} = w^{1-1} = 1.$$

Conditioned on $w \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$, it is possible to show that the algorithm returns a square root of unity *chosen uniformly at random* from among the four possible square roots of unity.

So with probability $1/2$, the output is a nontrivial square root. We can repeat this basic process n times, and eventually encounter a nontrivial square root of unity with probability $1 - 2^{-n}$. ■

to-do *more complete analysis*

12.5 Malleability of RSA, and Applications

We now discuss several surprising problems that turn out to be equivalent to the problem of inverting RSA. The results in this section rely on the following *malleability* property of RSA: Suppose you are given $c = m^e$ for an unknown message m . Assuming e is public, you can easily compute $c \cdot x^e = (mx)^e$. In other words, given the RSA function applied to m , it is possible to obtain the RSA function applied to a related message mx .

Inverting RSA on a small subset

Suppose you had a subroutine $\text{INVERT}(N, e, c)$ that inverted RSA (*i.e.*, returned $c^d \bmod N$) but only for, say, 1% of all possible c 's. That is, there exists some subset $G \subseteq \mathbb{Z}_N$ with $|G| \geq N/100$, such that for all $m \in G$ we have $m = \text{INVERT}(N, e, m^e)$.

If you happen to have a value $c = m^e$ for $m \notin G$, then it's not so clear how useful such a subroutine INVERT could be to you. However, it turns out that the subroutine can be used to invert RSA on *any input whatsoever*. Informally, if inverting RSA is easy on 1% of inputs, then inverting RSA is easy *everywhere*.

Assuming that we have such an algorithm INVERT , then this is how we can use it to invert RSA on any input:

```

REALLYINVERT( $N, e, c$ ):
do:
   $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N$ 
   $c' := c \cdot r^e \% N$ 
   $m' := \text{INVERT}(N, e, c')$ 
   $m := m' \cdot r^{-1}$ 
repeat if  $m^e \not\equiv_N c$ 
return  $m$ 

```

Suppose the input to REALLYINVERT involves $c = (m^*)^e$ for some unknown m^* . The goal is to output m^* .

In the main loop, c' is constructed to be an RSA encoding of $m^* \cdot r$. Since r is uniformly distributed in \mathbb{Z}_N , so is $m^* \cdot r$. So the probability of $m^* \cdot r$ being in the "good set" G is 1%. Furthermore, when it is in the good set, INVERT correctly returns $m^* \cdot r$. And in that case, REALLYINVERT outputs the correct answer m^* .

Each time through the main loop incurs a 1% chance of successfully inverting the given c . Therefore the expected running time of REALLYINVERT is $1/0.01 = 100$ times through the main loop.

Determining high-order bits of m

Consider the following problem: Given $c = m^e \bmod N$ for an unknown m , determine whether $m > N/2$ or $m < N/2$. That is, does m live in the top half or bottom half of \mathbb{Z}_N ?

We show a surprising result that even this limited amount of information is enough to completely invert RSA. Equivalently, if inverting RSA is hard, then it is not possible to tell whether m is in the top half or bottom half of \mathbb{Z}_N given $m^e \% N$.

The main idea is that we can do a kind of binary search in \mathbb{Z}_N . Suppose $\text{TOPHALF}(N, e, c)$ is a subroutine that can tell whether $c^d \bmod N$ is in $\{0, \dots, \frac{N-1}{2}\}$ or in $\{\frac{N+1}{2}, \dots, N-1\}$. Given a candidate c , we can call TOPHALF to reduce the possible range of m from \mathbb{Z}_N to either the top or bottom half. Consider the ciphertext $c' = c \cdot 2^e$, which encodes $2m$. We can use TOPHALF to now determine whether $2m$ is in the top half of \mathbb{Z}_N . If $2m$ is in the top half of \mathbb{Z}_N , then m is in the top half of its current range. Using this approach, we can repeatedly query TOPHALF to reduce the search space for m by half each time. In only $\log N$ queries we can uniquely identify m .

```

BSEARCH( $N, e, c$ ):
   $lo := 0; \quad hi := N - 1$ 
  for  $i = 1$  to  $\log N$ :
     $mid := (hi + lo)/2$ 
    if  $\text{TOPHALF}(N, e, c)$ :
       $hi := mid$ 
    else:
       $lo := mid$ 
   $c := c \cdot 2^e$ 
  return  $[hi]$ 
```

to-do *more complete analysis*

Exercises

- 12.1. Prove by induction the correctness of the EXTGCD algorithm. That is, whenever $(d, a, b) = \text{EXTGCD}(x, y)$, we have $\text{gcd}(x, y) = d = ax + by$. You may use the fact that the original Euclidean algorithm correctly computes the GCD.
- 12.2. Prove that if $g^a \equiv_n 1$ and $g^b \equiv_n 1$, then $g^{\text{gcd}(a,b)} \equiv_n 1$.
- 12.3. Prove that $\text{gcd}(2^a - 1, 2^b - 1) = 2^{\text{gcd}(a,b)} - 1$.
- 12.4. Prove that $x^a \% n = x^{a \% \phi(n)} \% n$. In other words, when working modulo n , you can reduce exponents modulo $\phi(n)$.
- 12.5. In this problem we determine the efficiency of Euclid's GCD algorithm. Since its input is a pair of numbers (x, y) , let's call $x + y$ the *size* of the input. Let F_k denote the k th Fibonacci number, using the indexing convention $F_0 = 1; F_1 = 2$. Prove that (F_k, F_{k-1})

is the smallest-size input on which Euclid's algorithm makes k recursive calls. *Hint:* Use induction on k .

Note that the size of input (F_k, F_{k-1}) is F_{k+1} , and recall that $F_{k+1} \approx \phi^{k+1}$, where $\phi \approx 1.618\dots$ is the golden ratio. Thus, for any inputs of size $N \in [F_k, F_{k+1})$, Euclid's algorithm will make less than $k \leq \log_{\phi} N$ recursive calls. In other words, the worst-case number of recursive calls made by Euclid's algorithm on an input of size N is $O(\log N)$, which is linear in the number of bits needed to write such an input.⁶

- 12.6. Consider the following **symmetric-key** encryption scheme with plaintext space $\mathcal{M} = \{0, 1\}^{\lambda}$. To encrypt a message m , we “pad” m into a prime number by appending a zero and then random non-zero bytes. We then multiply by the secret key. To decrypt, we divide off the key and then strip away the “padding.”

The idea is that decrypting a ciphertext without knowledge of the secret key requires factoring the product of two large primes, which is a hard problem.

<p><u>KeyGen:</u> choose random λ-bit prime k return k</p>	<p><u>Enc($k, m \in \{0, 1\}^{\lambda}$):</u> $m' := 10 \cdot m$ while m' not prime: $d \leftarrow \{1, \dots, 9\}$ $m' := 10 \cdot m' + d$ return $k \cdot m'$</p>
<p><u>Dec(k, c):</u> $m' := c/k$ while m' not a multiple of 10: $m' := \lfloor m'/10 \rfloor$ return $m'/10$</p>	

Show an attack breaking CPA-security of the scheme. That is, describe a distinguisher and compute its bias. *Hint:* ask for any two ciphertexts.

- 12.7. Explain why the RSA encryption exponent e must always be an odd number.
- 12.8. The Chinese Remainder Theorem states that there is always a solution for x in the following system of equations, when $\gcd(r, s) = 1$:

$$x \equiv_r u$$


$$x \equiv_s v$$

Give an example u, v, r, s , with $\gcd(r, s) \neq 1$ for which the equations have no solution. Explain why there is no solution.

- 12.9. Consider a rectangular grid of points, with width w and height h . Starting in the lower-left of the grid, start walking diagonally northeast. When you fall off end the grid, wrap around to the opposite side (*i.e.*, Pac-Man topology). Below is an example of the first few

⁶A more involved calculation that incorporates the cost of each division (modulus) operation shows the worst-case overall efficiency of the algorithm to be $O(\log^2 N)$ – quadratic in the number of bits needed to write the input.

steps you take on a grid with $w = 3$ and $h = 5$:



Show that if $\gcd(w, h) = 1$ then you will eventually visit every point in the grid.

Hint: Derive a formula for the coordinates of the point you reach after n steps.

- 12.10. Bob chooses an RSA plaintext $m \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ and encrypts it under Alice's public key as $c \equiv_N m^e$. To decrypt, Alice first computes $m_p \equiv_p c^d$ and $m_q \equiv_q c^d$, then uses the CRT conversion to obtain $m \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, just as expected. But suppose Alice is using faulty hardware, so that she computes a **wrong value** for m_q . The rest of the computation happens correctly, and Alice computes the (wrong) result \hat{m} . Show that, no matter what m is, and no matter what Alice's computational error was, Bob can factor N if he learns \hat{m} .

Hint: Bob knows m and \hat{m} satisfying the following:

$$\begin{aligned} m &\equiv_p \hat{m} \\ m &\not\equiv_q \hat{m} \end{aligned}$$

- 12.11. (a) Show that given an RSA modulus N and $\phi(N)$, it is possible to factor N easily.
Hint: you have two equations (involving $\phi(N)$ and N) and two unknowns (p and q).
- (b) Write a pari function that takes as input an RSA modulus N and $\phi(N)$ and factors N . Use it to factor the following 2048-bit RSA modulus. *Note:* take care that there are no precision issues in how you solve the problem; double-check your factorization!

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N = 133140272889335192922108409260662174476303831652383671688547009484
253235940586917140482669182256368285260992829447207980183170174867
620358952230969986447559330583492429636627298640338596531894556546
013113154346823212271748927859647994534586133553218022983848108421
465442089919090610542344768294481725103757222421917115971063026806
587141287587037265150653669094323116686574536558866591647361053311
046516013069669036866734126558017744393751161611219195769578488559
882902397248309033911661475005854696820021069072502248533328754832
698616238405221381252145137439919090800085955274389382721844956661
1138745095472005761807
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phi = 133140272889335192922108409260662174476303831652383671688547009484
253235940586917140482669182256368285260992829447207980183170174867
620358952230969986447559330583492429636627298640338596531894556546
013113154346823212271748927859647994534586133553218022983848108421
465442089919090610542344768294481725103757214932292046538867218497
635256772227370109066785312096589779622355495419006049974567895189
687318110498058692315630856693672069320529062399681563590382015177
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322909744749330702607931428154183726552004527201956226396835500346
 779062494259638983191178915027835134527751607017859064511731520440
 2981816860178885028680

12.12. True or false: if $x^2 \equiv_N 1$ then $x \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$. Prove or give a counterexample.

12.13. Discuss the computational difficulty of the following problem:

Given an integer N , find an element of $\mathbb{Z}_N \setminus \mathbb{Z}_N^$.*

If you can, relate its difficulty to that of other problems we've discussed (factoring N or inverting RSA).

12.14. (a) Show that it is possible to efficiently compute all four square roots of unity modulo pq , given p and q . *Hint: CRT!*

(b) Implement a pari function that takes distinct primes p and q as input and returns the four square roots of unity modulo pq . Use it to compute the four square roots of unity modulo

$1052954986442271985875778192663 \times 611174539744122090068393470777$.

★ 12.15. Show that, conditioned on $w \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$, the SqrtUnity subroutine outputs a square root of unity chosen uniformly at random from the 4 possible square roots of unity. *Hint: use the Chinese Remainder Theorem.*

12.16. Suppose N is an RSA modulus, and $x^2 \equiv_N y^2$, but $x \not\equiv_N \pm y$. Show that N can be efficiently factored if such a pair x and y are known.

12.17. Why are ± 1 the only square roots of unity modulo p , when p is an odd prime?

12.18. When N is an RSA modulus, why is squaring modulo N a 4-to-1 function, but raising to the e^{th} power modulo N is 1-to-1?

12.19. Implement a pari function that efficiently factors an RSA modulus N , given only N , e , and d . Use your function to factor the following 2048-bit RSA modulus. *Note: pari function valuation(n, p) returns the largest number d such that $p^d \mid n$.*

N = 157713892705550064909750632475691896977526767652833932128735618711
 213662561319634033137058267272367265499003291937716454788882499492
 311117065951077245304317542978715216577264400048278064574204140564
 709253009840166821302184014310192765595015483588878761062406993721
 851190041888790873152584082212461847511180066690936944585390792304
 663763886417861546718283897613617078370412411019301687497005038294
 389148932398661048471814117247898148030982257697888167001010511378
 647288478239379740416388270380035364271593609513220655573614212415
 962670795230819103845127007912428958291134064942068225836213242131
 15022256956985205924967
 e = 327598866483920224268285375349315001772252982661926675504591773242
 501030864502336359508677092544631083799700755236766113095163469666
 905258066495934057774395712118774014408282455244138409433389314036
 198045263991986560198273156037233588691392913730537367184867549274

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682884119866630822924707702796323546327425328705958528315517584489
590815901470874024949798420173098581333151755836650797037848765578
433873141626191257009250151327378074817106208930064676608134109788
601067077103742326030259629322458620311949453584045538305945217564
027461013225009980998673160144967719374426764116721861138496780008
6366258360757218165973
d = 138476999734263775498100443567132759182144573474474014195021091272
755207803162019484487127866675422608401990888942659393419384528257
462434633738686176601555755842189986431725335031620097854962295968
391161090826380458969236418585963384717406704714837349503808786086
701573765714825783042297344050528898259745757741233099297952332012
749897281090378398001337057869189488734951853748327631883502135139
523664990296334020327713900408683264232664645438899178442633342438
198329983121207315436447041915897544445402505558420138506655106015
215450140256129977382476062366519087386576874886938585789874186326
69265500594424847344765

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12.20. In this problem we'll see that it's bad to choose RSA prime factors p and q too close together.

- (a) Let $N = pq$ be an RSA modulus. Show that if you know N and $\delta = |p - q|$ then you can efficiently factor N .
- (b) Alice generated the following RSA modulus $N = pq$ and lets you know that $|p - q| < 10000$. Factor N :

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N = 874677518388996663638698301429866315858010681593301504361505917406
679600338654753978646639928231278257025792316921962329748948203153
633013718175380969169006125249183547099230845322374618855425387176
952865483432804575895177869626746459878695728149786382697571962961
898331255405534657194681056148437649091612403258304084081171824215
469594984981192162710052121535309254024720635781955739713239334398
494465828323810812843582187587256744901184016546638718414715249093
757039375585896257839327987501216755865353444704506441078034811012
930282857089819030160822729139768982546143104625315700571887037795
31855302859423676881

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12.21. Here is a slightly better method to factor RSA moduli whose factors are too close together. As before, let $N = pq$.

- (a) Define $t = (p + q)/2$. Note that when p and q are close, t is not much larger than \sqrt{N} . Show that:
- ▶ $t^2 - N$ is a perfect square.
 - ▶ Given t , it is possible to efficiently factor N . (*Hint*: write $t^2 - N = s^2$ for some s .)
- (b) Factor the following 2048-bit number (whose two prime factors are guaranteed to be close enough for the factoring approach to work in a reasonable amount of time, but far enough apart that you can't do the trial-and-error part by hand). How close were the factors (how large was $|p - q|$)?

Hint: pari has an issquare function. Also, be sure to do exact square roots over the integers, not the reals.

N = 514202868664266501986736340226343880193216864011643244558701956114
553317880043289827487456460284103951463512024249329243228109624011
915392411888724026403127686707255825056081890692595715828380690811
131686383180282330775572385822102181209569411961125753242467971879
131305986986525600110340790595987975345573842266766492356686762134
653833064511337433089249621257629107825681429573934949101301135200
918606211394413498735486599678541369375887840013842439026159037108
043724221865116794034194812236381299786395457277559879575752254116
612726596118528071785474551058540599198869986780286733916614335663
3723003246569630373323