Dear Judea,
Thank you for your message. I am sorry that my messages were so incoherent
that you couldn't understand them.
I agree that F = MA can be described by "Pearl-style causal diagrams." In
speaking about the uses and misuses of relative frequency statements in
inferential reasoning I was not referring to your theory. I was referring
to certain other people (legal scholars mainly) who do seem to think that
"ancillary hypotheses" can be "bare" relative frequency statements.
However, I continue to think that some sorts of relationships between
evidence and hypothesis are not aptly described in causal terms. You may
recall that you and I discussed this issue over the 'net briefly before. I
am not convinced that that inferential reasoning in causal terms is the
only way to go merely just because one thinks (as I do) that all relevant
evidence of an event ultimately MUST be causally related to an event for
which it serves as evidence . (By the same token, I think that some legal
scholars use _too little_ causal reasoning in their inferential arguments,
at least in their "abstract" analyses of the structure of inferential
argument about facts.)
Having said the above, I hasten to say that I do intend to study your work
more diligently than I have been able to study it thus far. (To that end I
have already ordered several of your books.) I do not expect that we will
end up agreeing about the relationship between "causality" and "inference."
But even if we do not end up agreeing, perhaps some further study on my
part will at least make oit possible for me to speak the same language that
you do.
Thank you for taking the time to reply.
Sincerely yours,
Peter T.
Judea Pearl wrote:
> Dear Peter,
>
> I read your mesg of last Monday and, unfortunately,
> I could not understand most of what you were trying to
> express. I must report, however, that if I understood correctly
> what you said about "Pearl-style diagrams", then
> your statement is regretfully false.
>
> Here is what you wrote:
> 3. The questions in par. 2 above bring me to an alternative to the sort
> of picture of inference that I have sketched above: Pearl-style causal
> reasoning. Isn't it the case that Pearl-style causal reasoning --
> despite being avowedly _"causal"_ -- isn't it the case that Pearl-style
> causal reasoning fails to "capture" the complexity of the sort of
> (jumbled) causal reasoning that is involved in my last example? Pearl's
> diagrams look "causal" to me _only_ in the sense that they posit that
> all events have an antecedent cause or causes. In every other respect,
> his diagrams make the links between events or propositions look like
> relative frequencies rather than like the sort of complex relationships
> that one finds in even simple "real" causal hypotheses such as F = MA.
>
> My response:
> I am not sure what need be "captured" in what you call
> "the complexity of the sort of (jumbled) causal reasoning
> that is involved in my last example? "
> but I am very very sure that the diagrams I am using
> are causal in every respect, that the
> the links between events or propositions have little to do
> with relative frequencies, and that
> your "real" causal hypotheses such as F = MA
> can be incorporated properly and formally into those
> diagrams.
>
> I would encourage you to read some of the latest literature
> on causal diagrams, eg., Proceedings of UAI 1990-1998,
> Biometrika, Dec. 1995, AIJ 1997, etc. or have a glimpse at my
> web site http://bayes.cs.ucla.edu/jp_home.html
> You will be pleased to discover there methods of
> formalizing, processing and learning many features
> of causal relationships , including effects of intervetions,
> counterfactuals, confounding, causal explanations, etc.
> including even measures of legal responsibility and
> "actual causation" which are of interest to
> legal scholars.
>
> I hope you take the time to read this literature,
> Enjoy,
> =========Judea
-- *********************************************************
Tillers' Dynamic Evidence Site
--with "frames":
http://www.tiac.net/users/tillers/index.html
--sans "frames":
http://www.tiac.net/users/tillers/home.html
**********************************************************
Peter Tillers, Professor of Law
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University
55 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10003, U.S.A.
(212) 790-0334; FAX (212) 790-0205
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Dear Judea,
Thank you for your message. I am sorry that my messages were so incoherent that you couldn't understand them.
I agree that F = MA can be described by "Pearl-style causal diagrams." In speaking about the uses and misuses of relative frequency statements in inferential reasoning I was not referring to your theory. I was referring to certain other people (legal scholars mainly) who do seem to think that "ancillary hypotheses" can be "bare" relative frequency statements.
However, I continue to think that some sorts of relationships between evidence and hypothesis are not aptly described in causal terms. You may recall that you and I discussed this issue over the 'net briefly before. I am not convinced that that inferential reasoning in causal terms is the only way to go merely just because one thinks (as I do) that all relevant evidence of an event ultimately MUST be causally related to an event for which it serves as evidence . (By the same token, I think that some legal scholars use _too little_ causal reasoning in their inferential arguments, at least in their "abstract" analyses of the structure of inferential argument about facts.)
Having said the above, I hasten to say that I do intend to study your work more diligently than I have been able to study it thus far. (To that end I have already ordered several of your books.) I do not expect that we will end up agreeing about the relationship between "causality" and "inference." But even if we do not end up agreeing, perhaps some further study on my part will at least make oit possible for me to speak the same language that you do.
Thank you for taking the time to reply.
Sincerely yours,
Peter T.
Judea Pearl wrote:
Dear Peter,-- *********************************************************I read your mesg of last Monday and, unfortunately,
I could not understand most of what you were trying to
express. I must report, however, that if I understood correctly
what you said about "Pearl-style diagrams", then
your statement is regretfully false.Here is what you wrote:
3. The questions in par. 2 above bring me to an alternative to the sort
of picture of inference that I have sketched above: Pearl-style causal
reasoning. Isn't it the case that Pearl-style causal reasoning --
despite being avowedly _"causal"_ -- isn't it the case that Pearl-style
causal reasoning fails to "capture" the complexity of the sort of
(jumbled) causal reasoning that is involved in my last example? Pearl's
diagrams look "causal" to me _only_ in the sense that they posit that
all events have an antecedent cause or causes. In every other respect,
his diagrams make the links between events or propositions look like
relative frequencies rather than like the sort of complex relationships
that one finds in even simple "real" causal hypotheses such as F = MA.My response:
I am not sure what need be "captured" in what you call
"the complexity of the sort of (jumbled) causal reasoning
that is involved in my last example? "
but I am very very sure that the diagrams I am using
are causal in every respect, that the
the links between events or propositions have little to do
with relative frequencies, and that
your "real" causal hypotheses such as F = MA
can be incorporated properly and formally into those
diagrams.I would encourage you to read some of the latest literature
on causal diagrams, eg., Proceedings of UAI 1990-1998,
Biometrika, Dec. 1995, AIJ 1997, etc. or have a glimpse at my
web site http://bayes.cs.ucla.edu/jp_home.html
You will be pleased to discover there methods of
formalizing, processing and learning many features
of causal relationships , including effects of intervetions,
counterfactuals, confounding, causal explanations, etc.
including even measures of legal responsibility and
"actual causation" which are of interest to
legal scholars.I hope you take the time to read this literature,
Enjoy,
=========Judea
Tillers' Dynamic Evidence Site**********************************************************--with "frames": http://www.tiac.net/users/tillers/index.html
--sans "frames": http://www.tiac.net/users/tillers/home.html