Re: [UAI] Fuzzy sets vs. Bayesian Network

From: Taner Bilgic (taner@boun.edu.tr)
Date: Mon Feb 28 2000 - 08:22:42 PST

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    I have not followed this thread but our review on interpretations and
    measurement of fuzzy membership functions may be of relevance.

    T. Bilgiç and I.B. Turksen (1999) "Measurement of Membership Functions:
    Theoretical and Empirical Work" Chapter 3 in D. Dubois and H. Prade
    (eds)
    Handbook of Fuzzy Sets and Systems Vol. 1, Fundamentals of Fuzzy Sets,
    Kluwer, pp. 195-232.
    http://www.ie.boun.edu.tr/~taner/publications/papers/membership.pdf

    Taner

    Kathryn Blackmond Laskey wrote:
    >
    > Scott,
    >
    > >> > First, remember that it's not the *probability* of being
    > >> > tall or small. It's not a probability at all. It's something
    > >> > else, sometimes called "possibility", which measures the
    > >> > degree something is true (not its frequency, or even one's
    > >> > belief that it's true).
    > >> This is true, but allow me to remark that I haven't seen any better
    > >> `definition' than ``it's something else''. No axiomatic foundations, such
    > >> that you can never be sure whether it's your calculus or your algorithm
    > >> that leads to bad results....
    > >
    > >Well, they do have a clear axiomatic foundation. I agree however
    > >that the fuzzy types have not given a clear interpretation of what
    > >possibility really *is*. What is this measure really measuring?
    > >...
    > >> > In a fuzzy set theory, the set of tall people
    > >> > and the set of small people could well be not mutually
    > >> > exclusive. I'm tall for a jockey, but pretty small for a
    > >> > basketball player. It makes a difference what the sets
    > >> > were constructed to represent.
    > >...
    > >So you think vagueness is "nothing more than incomplete
    > >information"? It's easy to show that it has nothing to do with
    > >incomplete information. I could have all the heights of every
    > >single individual in the population down to the nanometer,
    > >yet still not be sure whether someone deserves the appellation
    > >of "tall". There are still borderline cases. Or did you mean to
    > >say it is nothing more that incomplete *specification*? That's
    > >the more common argument.
    >
    > Probability is appropriate for sets satisfying the "clarity test." That
    > is, could a clairvoyant who knows the entire state of the world, past
    > present and future, down to the wave function of every quark, unambiguously
    > specify the value of the variable in question? For heights measured in
    > centimeters, the answer is yes (leaving out quantum fuzziness, which is
    > there but matters only in the fifteenth decimal place or so). For example,
    > our clairvoyant can easily answer questions such as whether my son Robbie
    > will be between 175 and 176 centimeters tall when he reaches his full adult
    > height. Therefore, it is fully appropriate to use a probability density
    > function on his adult height, (at least in the classical physics
    > approximation where people have definite heights -- which will serve most
    > of our modeling purposes just fine).
    >
    > However, as pointed out, even if we knew Robbie's adult height, we wouldn't
    > know whether he will be tall or not. I agree with the fuzzy folks that
    > there *is* something there that's important to capture. However, I've
    > tried in vain to get a number of different people in the fuzzy community to
    > tell me what a fuzzy membership actually means in operational terms. If
    > I'm going to use something in a serious engineering application, as opposed
    > to academic philosophizing, it is *very* useful to know what I'm doing in
    > theory, even if I do put in plenty of engineering hacks. As my thesis
    > advisor used to tell me, "First figure out what you would do if you could
    > do it right, and then figure out how to approximate it." If I don't KNOW
    > what the thing I'm trying to approximate with my engineering hacks would
    > mean if I could do it right, I'm rather uncomfortable.
    >
    > For probability theory we have several competing ontologies that have clear
    > operational meaning in the domains to which they apply. The most commonly
    > cited are (1) propensities based on physical symmetries; (2) limiting
    > frequencies of "random" events; (3) beliefs about uncertain phenomena. All
    > of these give clear operational criteria for connecting the referents of
    > the model to entities in the world and for recognizing when they do and
    > don't apply. Moreover, on nearly all problems to which more than one of
    > them is applicable, when applied by a competent modeler, they give nearly
    > indistinguishable answers to most questions of practical modeling interest.
    >
    > I have heard exactly one proposed ontology for fuzzy membership functions
    > (proposed by Judea Pearl, among others) that makes sense to me. Under this
    > proposed ontology, the fuzzy membership of Robbie's adult height in the set
    > "tall," in a given context, should be taken as proportional to the
    > probability that a generic person in that context would use the label
    > "tall" to describe Robbie. Thus, fuzzy memberships are likelihood
    > functions. We can think of them as soft evidence applied to numerical
    > crisp set height measurements.
    >
    > I might go beyond this and suggest an alternate criterion, that the fuzzy
    > membership be proportional to the *utility* for an appropriately defined
    > decision maker in that context of using the term "tall" to describe Robbie
    > (this, for example, would allow us to weigh costs of inappropriate usage of
    > the term).
    >
    > This proposed ontology makes a lot of sense at a surface level. However, I
    > know it is not what most fuzzy set researchers think they are talking about
    > when they use fuzzy memberships. I've never seen its mathematical
    > implications worked out, or seen any discussions about whether or under
    > what circumstances it gives rise to combination rules that look anything
    > like what the fuzzy people now use.
    >
    > I therefore find myself in the difficult position of being highly
    > sympathetic to the concerns that drove people to invent fuzzy sets in the
    > first place, but extremely skeptical about whether what they've developed
    > solves the problem they set out to solve in an acceptable way.
    >
    > Kathy Laskey

    - --
    Taner Bilgic taner@boun.edu.tr
    Department of Industrial Engineering Tel: +90-212-263 1540 x2078
    Bogazici University Fax: +90-212-265 1800
    Bebek TR-80815 Istanbul Turkey http://www.ie.boun.edu.tr/~taner

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